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Uncertainty relations give upper bounds on the accuracy by which the outcomes of two incompat-
ible measurements can be predicted. While established uncertainty relations apply to cases where
the predictions are based on purely classical data (e.g., a description of the system’s state before
measurement), an extended relation which remains valid in the presence of quantum information
has been proposed recently [Berta et al., Nat. Phys. 6, 659 (2010)]. Here, we generalize this un-
certainty relation to one formulated in terms of smooth entropies. Since these entropies measure
operational quantities such as extractable secret key length, our uncertainty relation is of immediate
practical use. To illustrate this, we show that it directly implies security of a family of quantum key
distribution protocols including BB84. Our proof remains valid even if the measurement devices
used in the experiment deviate arbitrarily from the theoretical model.
Introduction.—Quantum mechanics has the peculiar
property that, even if the state of a system is fully known,
certain measurements will result in a random outcome.
In other words, the information contained in the descrip-
tion of a system’s state is generally not sufficient to pre-
dict measurement outcomes with certainty. Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle [1] can be seen as a quantitative
characterization of this property.
We consider a quantum system, A, and two positive
operator valued measurements (POVMs) acting on it,
X with elements {Mx}, and Z with elements {Nz}. In its
entropic version, as first proposed by Deutsch and later
proved by Maassen and Uffink [2] and Krishna et al. [3],
the uncertainty principle reads
H (X|S) +H (Z|S) ≥ q . (1)
H denotes the Shannon or von Neumann entropy and
characterizes the uncertainty about the measurement
outcomes X of X or Z of Z given any classical description,
S, of the state of A before measurement [4]. (The most
general classical description of A is a full characteriza-
tion of its density matrix.) The bound, q, quantifies the
“incompatibility” of the two measurements and is inde-
pendent of the state of A before measurement [5]:
q := log
2
1
c
, where c := max
x,z
∣∣∣
∣∣∣
√
Mx
√
Nz
∣∣∣
∣∣∣
2
∞
. (2)
One may now consider an agent, who, instead of hold-
ing a classical description S of A, has access to a quan-
tum system, B, which is fully entangled with A. It is
easy to verify that this agent can predict the outcome
of any possible orthogonal measurement applied to A by
performing a suitable measurement on his share of the
entangled state. In other words, (1) is not valid in such
a generalized scenario. However, as first conjectured by
Renes and Boileau [4], and later proved by Berta et al. [6]
and Coles et al. [7], the relation
H (X|B) +H (Z|C) ≥ q (3)
holds in general, for two disjoint, not necessarily classical,
systems B and C. If both systems contain only a classical
description S of the state on A, we recover (1) [8].
To make the above statements more precise, let ρABC
be any quantum state on three systems A, B and C. After
measuring A with respect to X and storing the outcome
in a classical register, X, the joint state of X and the
system B is given by [9]
ρXB :=
∑
x
|x〉〈x| ⊗ τx
B
, where τx
B
= trAC
(
Mx ρABC
)
.
(The possible measurement outcomes of X are encoded in
an orthonormal basis {|x〉} and the probability of mea-
suring x is given by tr(τx
B
).) Similarly, we define ρZC,
where the measurement Z instead of X is applied to A
and where we keep system C instead of B. The condi-
tional von Neumann entropies in (3) are then evaluated
for these states, i.e. H (X|B) = H(ρXB)−H(ρB).
The main contribution of this work is to generalize (3)
to smooth entropies [10, 11], which are generalizations
of the von Neumann entropy. Crucially, in contrast to
the latter, they characterize operational quantities be-
yond the standard i.i.d. scenario [12]. For example, the
smooth min-entropy of a random variable X conditioned
on a system B, denoted Hε
min
(X|B), corresponds to the
number of bits contained in X that are ε-close to uni-
formly distributed and independent of the quantum sys-
tem B, where ε ≥ 0 is the smoothing parameter. Sim-
ilarly the smooth max-entropy of Z conditioned on C,
denoted Hε
max
(Z|C), corresponds to the number of bits
that are needed in order to reconstruct the value Z using
the quantum system C up to a failure probability ε.
The generalized uncertainty relation reads
Hε
min
(X|B) +Hε
max
(Z|C) ≥ q . (4)
It implies most existing uncertainty relations for two in-
compatible measurements [13]. In particular, it general-
izes and strengthens an uncertainty relation derived via
operational interpretations of the smooth entropies [14].
2We recover (3) by applying the entropic asymptotic
equipartition property [15] to (4). Moreover, for ε = 0
and disregarding B and C, we find a generalization to
POVMs of a result by Maassen and Uffink [2], bound-
ing the uncertainty in terms of Re´nyi entropies [16] of
order 1/2 and ∞, namely H∞(X) +H1/2(Z) ≥ q.
The uncertainty principle has provided intuition for
various applications, in particular in cryptography. How-
ever, previous uncertainty relations could not be applied
directly, since the von Neumann entropy is often not the
relevant measure of uncertainty. (See [6] for examples
and a discussion.) Our uncertainty relation overcomes
this limitation. Potential areas of application include en-
tanglement witnessing, the bounded storage model [17]
and quantum cryptography in general.
As an example, we show that the relation naturally
leads to a concise and general security proof for quantum
key distribution (QKD) [18, 19]. When applied to prac-
tical prepare-and-measure protocols, it yields a strictly
stronger security claim than previously known proofs. In
particular, non-trivial security bounds can be obtained
for realistic choices of the parameters (such as the num-
ber of exchanged signals). In addition, these bounds do
not depend on the details of the measurement devices and
are therefore maximally robust against imperfections in
their implementation.
Smooth Entropies.—For our purposes, quantum states
are positive semi-definite operators with trace smaller or
equal to 1 on a finite-dimensional Hilbert space. Given a
state ρA on (a Hilbert space) A, we say that ρAB extends
ρA on B if trB(ρAB) = ρA. A purification is an extension of
rank 1. We write ρ ≈ε τ if the purified distance between
ρ and τ (which is defined as the minimum trace distance
between purifications of ρ and τ ; see [20] for details) does
not exceed ε.
We now define the smooth min- and max-entropy. Let
ε ≥ 0 and ρAB be a bipartite state on A and B. The
min-entropy of A given B is defined as
H
min
(A|B)ρ := max
σB
sup
{
λ ∈ R : 2−λ 1A ⊗ σB ≥ ρAB
}
,
where σB is maximized over all states on B and 1A is the
identity operator on A. Furthermore, the ε-smooth min-
entropy is defined as Hε
min
(A|B)ρ := maxρ˜Hmin(A|B)ρ˜,
where the optimization is over all states ρ˜AB ≈ε ρAB.
The smooth max-entropy is its dual [20, 21] with re-
gards to any purification ρABC of ρAB in the sense that
Hε
max
(A|B)ρ := −Hεmin(A|C)ρ . (5)
We are now ready to restate our uncertainty relation.
Theorem 1. Let ε ≥ 0, let ρABC be a tri-partite quantum
state and let X and Z be two POVMs on A. Then,
Hε
min
(X|B)ρ +Hεmax(Z|C)ρ ≥ q ,
where the entropies are evaluated using ρXB and ρZC, re-
spectively, and ρXB, ρZC and q are defined as above.
Proof of the Main Result.—It will be helpful to de-
scribe the two measurements in the Stinespring dilation
picture as isometries followed by a partial trace. Let
U be the isometry from A to A, X and X′ given by
U :=
∑
x |x〉 ⊗ |x〉 ⊗
√
Mx. The isometry stores two
copies of the measurement outcome in the registers X and
X′ and the post-measurement state in A. Analogously,
V :=
∑
z |z〉⊗ |z〉⊗
√
Nz. Furthermore, we introduce the
states ρXX′ABC := UρABCU
† and ρZZ′ABC := V ρABCV
†, of
which the post-measurement states appearing in Theo-
rem 1, ρXB and ρZC, are marginals.
We now proceed to prove the theorem for the special
case where ρABC is pure and ε = 0.
The duality relation (5) applied to ρZZ′ABC gives
H
max
(Z|C)ρ +Hmin(Z|Z′AB)ρ = 0 . (6)
Comparing (6) with the statement of the theorem, it re-
mains to show that H
min
(Z|Z′AB)ρ ≤ Hmin(X|B)ρ − q
holds. By the definition of the min-entropy, we have
H
min
(Z|Z′AB)ρ
= max
σ
Z
′
AB
sup{λ ∈ R : 2−λ 1Z ⊗ σZ′AB ≥ ρZZ′AB}
≤ max
σ
Z
′
AB
sup{λ ∈ R : 2−λ c1X ⊗ σB ≥ ρXB} (7)
= H
min
(X|B)ρ − q ,
where, in order to arrive at (7), we need to show that
2−λ 1Z ⊗ σZ′AB ≥ ρZZ′AB =⇒ 2−λ c1X ⊗ σB ≥ ρXB . (8)
For this, we apply the partial isometry W := UV †
followed by a partial trace over X′ and A on both sides
of the inequality on the left-hand side. This implies
2−λ trX′A
(
W (1Z ⊗ σZ′AB)W †
) ≥ ρXB . (9)
Moreover, substituting the definition of W , we find
trX′A
(
W (1Z ⊗ σZ′AB)W †
)
=
∑
x,z
|x〉〈x| ⊗ 〈z|trA
(√
NzMx
√
NzσZ′AB
)|z〉 (10)
≤ c1X ⊗ σB . (11)
To get (10), we used the orthonormality of {|x〉}x and
{|z〉}z as well as the cyclicity of the partial trace over A.
Moreover, in the last step, we used that
√
NzMx
√
Nz =
∣∣√Nz
√
Mx
∣∣2 ≤ c1A.
Finally, combining (11) with (9) establishes (8), conclud-
ing the proof for ε = 0 and pure states.
Next, we generalize this proof to ε-smooth entropies.
The purified distance used in the definition of the smooth
entropies has some interesting properties [20] that we use
in the following: (i) Let E be any trace non-increasing
3completely positive map (e.g. a partial isometry or a par-
tial trace). Then, ρ ≈ε τ implies E(ρ) ≈ε E(τ). (ii) Let
ρAB be a fixed extension of ρA. Then, ρA ≈ε τA implies
that there exists an extension τAB of τA that is ε-close to
ρAB. Furthermore, if ρAB is pure and |supp {τA}| ≤ dimB,
then τAB can be chosen pure.
Let ρ˜ZC ≈ε ρZC be a state that minimizes the smooth
max-entropy, i.e. Hε
max
(Z|C)ρ = Hmax(Z|C)ρ˜. Using
the properties of the purified distance discussed above,
we introduce a purification ρ˜ZZ′ABC, a state ρ˜XX′ABC :=
Wρ˜ZZ′ABCW
† and its marginal ρ˜XB, which are ε-close to
the corresponding states ρ. Applying the duality rela-
tion (6) as well as the argument in (7) to ρ˜ results in
H
max
(Z|C)ρ˜+Hmin(X|B)ρ˜ ≥ q, from which the claim fol-
lows due to the maximization over close states used in
the definition of the smooth min-entropy.
Finally, to generalize the result to mixed states, we
write down the uncertainty relation for a purification
ρABCD of ρABC, i.e. H
ε
min
(X|B) +Hε
max
(Z|CD) ≥ q. The
claim is now a direct consequence of the data-processing
inequality [20] establishing Hε
max
(Z|CD) ≤ Hε
max
(Z|C).
Application to Quantum Key Distribution.—In the
following, we consider practically relevant prepare-and-
measure schemes such as BB84 [18]. In these schemes,
one party, called Alice, prepares a sequence of non-
orthogonal quantum states and sends them over a pub-
lic quantum channel to a second party, Bob, who mea-
sures these states. The correlated data gathered during
this first phase of the protocol form the raw keys, from
which Alice and Bob can then extract a final secret key by
a classical post-processing procedure (requiring only lo-
cal operations and communication over an authenticated
channel).
Amid recent hacking attacks on commercial QKD
systems [22, 23], it is important to point out that
information-theoretic security proofs for quantum cryp-
tography rely on several assumptions in addition to the
validity of quantum mechanics. 1) The two parties, Alice
an Bob, have access to genuine randomness. 2) The infor-
mation that leaves each lab is restricted to what the pro-
tocol allows. 3) The measurement devices work according
to the specifications of the protocol. These assumptions
are often not satisfied by realistic implementations.
Our novel security proof allows us to partially drop As-
sumption 3, which concerns Bob’s measurement device.
Moreover, Assumption 2 can be weakened to allow for
certain imperfections of Alice’s state preparation. The
proof is based on the intuition, first formalized by May-
ers [24] and captured by the uncertainty relation, that
security of QKD can be derived from the fact that Al-
ice has a choice between two incompatible bases for state
preparation. The fact that Bob can accurately estimate
the states Alice prepared in both bases directly implies
that an eavesdropper cannot. Furthermore, this impli-
cation holds independently of how Bob obtains his data,
i.e., no assumption about Bob’s measurement device is
required except that it is memoryless.
The proof relies on two main ingredients: (i) the uncer-
tainty relation (Theorem 1) and (ii) the following result
that bounds the number of secret key bits that can be
extracted from raw keys by classical post-processing. As-
sume that Alice and Bob hold correlated data, X and X′,
about which an adversarymay have information E. Then,
Alice and Bob can employ a classical post-processing pro-
cedure (usually consisting of an error correction scheme
concatenated with a procedure called privacy amplifica-
tion [25, 26]), which generates a shared secret key of
length [27]
ℓ ≈ Hε
min
(X|E) −Hε
max
(X|X′) . (12)
(This can be seen as a single-shot version of the Devetak-
Winter bound [28].) In other words, the length of the
key that can be generated is essentially determined by
the difference between the uncertainty that the adversary
has about Alice’s raw key X, measured in terms of the
smooth min-entropy, and the uncertainty that Bob has
about X, measured in terms of the smooth max-entropy.
While the following arguments are rather general, we
may for concreteness consider the BB84 protocol. For
the purpose of the proof we use its entanglement-based
version, which implies security of the original prepare-
and-measure scheme [29]. Here, it is assumed that Alice
and Bob start with an untrusted joint quantum state,
ρAB, from which they extract a secret key. This state is
supposed to be a sequence of maximally entangled qubits
but may, in the presence of an adversary or noise, be arbi-
trarily corrupted. The protocol then proceeds as follows.
First, Alice and Bob both measure each of these qubits
with respect to a basis chosen at random from two pos-
sibilities, X and Z, resulting in bit strings X (for Alice)
and X′ (for Bob). Next, they perform statistical tests
on a few sample bits taken from X and X′ in order to
estimate the correlation. If this correlation is sufficiently
large, they apply the above-mentioned post-processing
procedure to turn their raw keys into a fully secret key
of an appropriate length, ℓ. Otherwise, if the estimated
correlation is too small, they abort the protocol.
To prove that this protocol produces a secret key, it
suffices to verify that the entropy difference in (12) is
positive under the condition that the raw keys passed the
correlation test. The second term of (12), Hε
max
(X|X′),
directly depends on the correlation strength between the
raw keys. For example, if X and X′ consist of n bits,
of which at most a fraction δ disagree (according to the
statistical test performed during the protocol), we have
Hε
max
(X|X′) / nh(δ) , (13)
where h(·) denotes the binary entropy and n is the num-
ber of bits in the raw key.
The first term in (12), Hε
min
(X|E), depends on the cor-
relations between X and the adversary’s information E,
4which is not accessible to Alice and Bob. The challenge
is to bound these correlations from the data that is avail-
able, namely the correlations between X and X′. This is
exactly where our uncertainty relation steps in.
Recall that, according to the protocol description, Al-
ice and Bob measure each of their qubits with respect
to one out of two different bases. One may now think
of a hypothetical run of the protocol where Alice and
Bob use the opposite basis choice for the measurement
of each of their qubits, resulting in outcomes Y and Y′,
respectively. We may then apply our uncertainty rela-
tion, which gives
Hε
min
(X|E) ≥ qn−Hε
max
(Y|Y′) = qn−Hε
max
(X|X′) ,
where q is evaluated for Alice’s apparatus [30]. The last
equality follows because the choice of basis was random
for each qubit, and hence the correlation between Y and
Y
′ is identical to the one between X and X′. Insert-
ing this into (12) and using (13), we conclude that the
protocol generates a secure key of length
ℓ ≈ n(q − 2h(δ)) . (14)
We emphasize that, in contrast to security proofs based
on previous versions of the uncertainty relation, e.g. [31]
and [6], this security proof does not rely on additional
arguments such as the post-selection technique [32], the
de Finetti theorem [33] and the quantum asymptotic
equipartition property [11, 15]. Employing these tools
introduces additional terms in (14) that reduce the ex-
tractable key length significantly for experimentally fea-
sible values of n. Our proof technique will therefore lead
to tighter finite-key bounds [34, 35].
Finally, we note that our approach is different
from recent device-independent security proofs for
entanglement-based protocols [19], which are based on
a violation of Bell’s theorem [36, 37]. In these proofs
Assumption 3 applies to both parties and cannot be
dropped—instead, it may be replaced by the assumption
that the measurement devices are memoryless.
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